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swallowing live frogs; and, thus rationally convinced, he may swallow a first frog, then the second; but at the third his stomach will revolt. In the same way, the growing influence of the doctrine on my way of thinking came up against the resistance of my whole nature.

The decision to refuse all complicity with the tyranny of the East—is this enough to satisfy one's conscience? I do not think so. I have won my freedom; but let me not forget that I stand in daily risk of losing it once more. For in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform —to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of a mortal sin.

My book takes the reader into the world inhabited by the intellectuals of Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest. It is a world familiar to me, but it may well seem to him foreign and even exotic. I try to explain how the human mind functions in the people's democracies. If I have been able to write this book, it is because the system invented by Moscow has seemed, and still seems to me infinitely strange. Any civilization, if one looks at it with an assumption of naive simplicity (as Swift looked at the England of his day), will present a number of bizarre features which men accept as perfectly natural because they are familiar. But nowhere is this so marked as in the new civilization of the East, which moulds the lives of eight hundred millions of human beings. We are, I think, only beginning to understand it, and in years to come thousands of books will be devoted to the study of this stupefying and loathsome phenomenon.

This book is at the same time a battlefield, in which I have given shape to my combats with the doctrine I have rejected. This, then, explains my method of writing; I give

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12/ the enemy his arms, I follow his arguments, at times I even copy his way of reasoning. In other words, I seek to create afresh the stages by which the mind gives way to compulsion from without, and to trace the road along which men in people's democracies are led on to orthodoxy.

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Introduction

121 SINCE 1948-1949 an industrial revolution has been taking place in the mid-European area now controlled by the satellite governments which in turn are controlled by Soviet Russia. According to the long-range plans adopted by the governments of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, several thousand new, large and medium-sized industrial plants (including mines and power plants) are being erected all over the captive area, while thousands of existing plants are being modernized, developed and extended. A score or two of the new plants under construction, or still in the blueprint stage, may be described as huge even by American standards. A large part of this program — possibly as much as half of it — had already been implemented by the end of 1951, with the result that the heavy industrial potential of the area has been doubled in comparison with that of 1938. At least, that is what the leading Communist economists of the area are claiming.[1] The other half of the program remains to be fulfilled by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 when the present five or six year plans are expected to terminate in most of the captive area. Under relentless pressure of the Soviet Union, the satellite governments are doing everything in their power to fulfill and overfulfill the prescribed program if possible ahead of schedule. The issue of the armament race between the West and the Soviet Empire depends very largely on the success or failure of the industrial development of captive Europe.

The feasibility of this huge program depends in turn on the fuel and power at the disposal of the satellite governments at present and during the next few years. The captive area cannot count upon any large-scale importation of fuel and power from

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121 outside — though there are small local exceptions to this rule — and must itself produce enough not only to cover all its own present and future requirements but also to export considerable amounts of coal and oil to Russia and Western Europe. As the demand for fuel and power for industry, transportation and domestic use is increasing fast, the captive area must develop its supply of fuel and power at a correspondingly rapid rate. If it does not, the long-range economic plans will not be fulfilled in time.

Theoretically, a large increase in the output of fuel and power is feasible. The mid-European captive area possesses considerable wealth in sources of fuel and power, a great part of which has not yet been fully exploited. Among these resources, the great Silesian coal field, now shared by Poland and Czechoslovakia, with its reserves equal to, if not larger than, those of the Ruhr basin in Germany, is undoubtedly the most important. The area also possesses enormous reserves of lignite in Eastern Germany and Bohemia, petroleum in Rumania, Albania and the Soviet zone of Austria, and considerable water power in the basins of the Danube, the Vistula, and the Balkan rivers. Because of its coal, lignite and water power, the area is already producing much electric power and is capable of producing in the near future twice or even three times as much, thus reaching the Western European level of production.

Practically, however, the implementation of the vast program is meeting with many difficulties, and will meet with more in the near future.

A more detailed analysis of the fuel and power production in the captive area, both actual and planned, follows.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production.

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the production of individual basins.

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

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PREFACE

N. S. Khrushchev's speech of September 8, 1953, in which the dismal state of Soviet agriculture was first acknowledged by a top Soviet leader, and the splurge of agricultural concessions offered by Soviet and Satellite governments in the ensuing months, have focused widespread attention in the Western World on the question of the viability of the Communist agricultural system.

Many Western observers have long been convinced that the nature of Soviet economic growth prohibits the development of a healthy agriculture. The present desperate efforts to create some order in the economic disarray revealed by Khrushchev and others have only confirmed the harshest judgments of these observers. It seemed appropriate, therefore, that at the same time as the Communist leaders were engaged in a revaluation of agricultural policy that a serious effort be made – on this side of the Iron Curtain – to assess the nature of the current crisis and the agricultural system that produced it.

• • •

This study is primarily concerned with the agricultural structure of the East European Satellites of the Soviet Union, and with the efforts those Satellite regimes have made to transplant the developed Soviet agricultural system to new terrain.

The basic characteristics of the land system which the Soviet planners devised and put into practice during the first Five Year Plan are taken up in order to set the background for the Satellite efforts to duplicate the Soviet model in the 1948-53 period. This new type of land structure is treated not merely as the expression of a specific ideology, but as part of a set of economic relations upon which the Communist State and industrial machine rests. In other words, collectivized agriculture is not only a Marxist dogma, but a functioning economic system which in the quarter century of its existence has performed considerable services for its Communist masters. The fact that collectivized agriculture was imposed by force, is held together only by the most vigilant and brutal police

● 121 action, and is based upon a general decline in living standards for both workers and peasants, should not obscure the fact that the modern Soviet political and economic system would be impossible without it.

The success which the Soviet agricultural apparatus has achieved in increasing the State's share of the total agricultural produce is considered one of the keys to the endurance of this apparatus and the continued Communist reliance upon it.

The study then proceeds to describe the East European agricultural "revolution," and examines particularly those aspects which distinguished it from the Russian Revolution. The attempt to duplicate the Soviet land structure is explored with these important distinguishing characteristics in mind. The same criteria by which the Soviet system was measured are applied to the East European agricultural system – the degree of increased peasant exploitation – and comparisons are made which indicate why Soviet collectivization was so much more successful than its Eastern Europe counterpart.

The study ends with an examination of the present agricultural crisis. The problems involved are no longer merely tactical, but have become increasingly institutional. The agricultural system which the Communists imposed upon the population has now begun to impose itself upon the Communists. Its internal mechanism exercises considerable force of its own, and the New Course which engulfed the Communist world after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 is analyzed in these terms.

• • •

The antagonism between town and country described in this paper has not been confined to the history of industrialization in the Communist countries. The capacity of dynamic urban forces to manipulate the market to the detriment of the less-organized peasantry is a part of the story of industrialization of nearly every modern nation.

But this study describes an area of the world where this antagonism has been raised to the highest pitch by political regimes of unprecedented authority and brutality. The complete political disenfranchisement of the peasantry has resulted in a degree of exploitation hardly equalled in modern times.

This extraordinary economic feat has been made possible partly by the degree to which the Communist regimes have been able to

exploit the workin classes under whose banners they took power, 121
and whose enforced sacrifice of purchasing power has made Communist industrialization programs economically feasible.

The success of the Communist economic program then is largely a reflection of the ability of the Communist dictatorship to exploit *all* of the oppressed classes to a degree hitherto considered impossible. But this success, as Stalin's successors have discovered, is a very fragile thing, requiring constant care and protection from those millions whose forced sacrifices made it possible.

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114 727 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of monochrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

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● 121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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The second part used to be called the Balkans, because these lands, north of the Greek seas, were identified with the mountains which traversed them. Ancient Rome had established its power on their slopes, and later the peoples who settled there after the Slovenian invasions of the Dark Ages accepted the faith of the Eastern Church. To this they clung with fidelity during centuries of subjection to the Turks; and as soon as their freedom had been regained this faith was everywhere restored in cities and rural communes alike. It is unfortunate that so little about this aspect of Rumanian and Bulgarian history has been known to us generally. Recalled recently with philosophic nostalgia in such books as Gheorghiu's *Twenty-fifth Hour*, some awareness of it is an indispensable prerequisite for judging what has happened during the last terrible years.

The third part consists of Poland outside the old Austrian border, the small Baltic States to the north (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) given back to bondage by Hitler in an hour of mad bargaining for power, and those territories taken from Germany in the aftermath of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The tragedy which has befallen these peoples is heartrending. It is believed, for example, that one-fourth of the population of Estonia has been deported to Siberia by the Russians. Whatever the blunders of all governments concerned may have been, it is difficult to read the chronicles of horror inflicted on their erstwhile subjects without shuddering. There is little even in the history of Nazi savagery which can outdo, for example, the conquest of German Silesia. Consider, by way of illustration, the fate of Neisse, center of Silesian Catholic activity, which was entered by the Russian army on Palm Sunday, 1945. After scenes of rape, murder, and violence almost unparalleled even in the long history of war, the little city with its priceless churches was put to the torch, so that the thousand inmates of the great home for the aged burned to death in their

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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PREFACE

In the course of the Second World War the Soviet Armies entered a number of countries in Europe and stayed in them some months or years. These are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. A study of the conditions of the hundred million people inhabiting this region is of great interest in itself; it gains even more from the fact that such a study throws light, from a new vantage point, on the Russian reality. Napoleon said: 'Une armée dehors, c'est l'État qui voyage', and the study of the influence of the Soviet 'armée dehors' teaches us about the essence of the Soviet State itself. The fact that there are more chinks in the 'Iron Curtain' between the Russian satellites and the rest of the world than between the older and better preserved curtain shutting out Russia, facilitates the study of the nature of Stalin's regime through the prism of conditions in the satellite countries. These conditions must be comprehended in the dynamics of their change, the dynamics of the rise and consolidation of the rule of the Communist Parties.

Although the same Party rules in the Soviet Zone of Germany, I have not thought it advisable to cover this area in the present study, as it is impossible to survey this Zone without covering Germany as a whole, which is in itself a wide and complicated question. Another Communist-dominated State I have omitted is Albania, the reason being the scarcity and poverty of information regarding this tiny country.

A study of current history is always fraught with the risk that the absence of distance tends to endanger accuracy of knowledge and scientific detachment; the risk exists that a more unified impression is given than knowledge of the subject warrants, and that conclusions are coloured by personal values. The only counter to this is scientific scrupulousness. While the difficulties in the way of the study of current history must be borne in mind, the study itself is not to be avoided, as it is part of history itself, and the effort to understand and

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was in the mode of appropriation, in the legal expression of the right to exploit.*

Another example of class exploitation based not on private but on 'public' ownership is the Church of the Middle Ages. The Church acquired about a third of all the land of Europe as a whole, and in some countries even the majority of the land (e.g. Hungary, Bohemia). Formally, this was public property, the property of the Christian community, and it bore the official name of 'patrimonium pauperum'—the inheritance of the poor. This, however, did not make the conditions of the serfs on Church land fundamentally different from those of the serfs on the private feudal estates. For even though the clergy did not have the right of inheritance (not being allowed to raise families) and were often of plebeian origin, they were not less harsh exploiters than the feudal nobility. Thus 'public' property by itself does not exclude the exploitation of man by man.

The first part of this book attempts to show that the chief means of production and exchange in the Russian satellites are in the hands of the state (in part the Russian state), and that they will be more and more so concentrated. The second part attempts to show that these countries have undemocratic, totalitarian police regimes, which means that they are not 'owned' by the people—workers, peasants and intellectuals—but by the self-appointing and self-perpetuating bureaucracy itself. From these two propositions, if they can be proved, the

*Sources used on feudalism in the Arab East:

A. N. Poliak—*Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon*, London, 1939.

A. N. Poliak—*Les Révoltes Populaires en Egypte a l'Epoque des Mamelukes et leurs causes économiques*. Appeared in *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Paris, 1934.

A. N. Poliak—Various articles that appeared in the Hebrew periodical *Hamezhek Hashituti*, Tel Aviv.

A. Kremer —*Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam*, Leipzig, 1868.

A. Kremer —*Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Wien, 1875-7.

C. H. Becker —*Beiträge zur geschichte Aegyptens unter dem Islam*, Strassbourg, 1902-3.

†There have even been cases of state-ownership of the means of production with *equality* between the different 'owners' of the state, equality in the right collectively to exploit those whom the state owned. Spartan society was a case of 'communism' in slave ownership. Kautsky characterized this regime in the following terms: 'The Spartans made up the minority, perhaps a tenth of the population. Their state was based on real War Communism, the barrack communism of the ruling class. Plato drew his ideal of the state from it. The ideal differed from real Sparta only in that it was not the military chiefs, but the "philosophers", that is, the intellectuals, who directed the war communism'. (*Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Zweiten Band, Berlin, 1927, pp. 132-3).

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121 only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

471 *The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory*

466 The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

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Preface

101 Eastern Europe—the region embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and for certain limited purposes the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria as well—has long been familiar to students of European history. To Western public opinion in general, however, this region has become known chiefly as a result of the two world wars, for which it provided some of the major diplomatic problems and military battlefields.

000 Despite the significant role of Eastern Europe, the Western democracies have tended to regard it primarily as a region of inherent economic poverty and political instability. They have failed either to recognize the extent to which its problems reflected their own policies, or to see it as an area vital to their security. This lack of understanding of the problems and significance of Eastern Europe was most conspicuous at the end of the Second World War. At that time decisions were reached and concessions made by the West on the basis of assumptions that were not firmly grounded in the realities of this region. Important lessons were eventually learned, but not until great harm had been done to the peoples of Eastern Europe and consequently also to the welfare of the Western democracies.

•121 The purpose of the essays in this volume is to review the record of the recent past in order to interpret the many-sided

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• 121 challenge presented by Eastern Europe. They describe this region in its transition from agrarian underdevelopment and political strife toward a more complex society, a more productive economy, and a more stable political system. The end of this process of transition is not yet in sight, and it has in most respects been set back by the policies of the Communist regimes since the Second World War. At the same time Eastern Europe remains a region of dynamic developments that have remained in many ways beyond the range of Western understanding.

These essays reflect the considerable diversity in experience and points of view of the authors. Some have wrestled with the problems of Eastern Europe as responsible members of governments both before and since the Second World War. Although they are acquainted at first hand with the policies of the Communist regimes, they write less from bitterness than from a desire to interpret for the West the lessons of their experience. Others bring to their subjects such objectivity as is afforded by academic study, and view Eastern Europe with a degree of abstraction difficult for those whose families and careers are directly involved. Still others combine academic study with some measure of personal experience that has permitted them to test the values that printed volumes do not always convey.

These diversities of background and viewpoint are merged in the common desire to interpret the challenge offered by Eastern Europe to the leaders of the Western democracies. Underlying these essays is the belief that a careful survey of the problems of this region is a first and essential step in the search for solutions in a democratic spirit. Although no blueprint for meeting the challenge of Eastern Europe is here attempted, an understanding of this region essential to the drafting of such a blueprint is offered.

000 With one exception, these essays were presented in a somewhat different form as lectures at the Institute of Public Af-

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2 The Liberal Tradition

HUBERT RIPKA

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829 This essay will endeavor to show that liberalism has its own tradition in the countries of Eastern Europe and that the liberal regimes set up in this area succumbed not so much to internal factors as to the unfavorable international situation. In other words, the development of liberalism in this region between the two world wars was a part of the course of liberal democracy in Europe as a whole.

I

829 It is necessary first to define liberalism. This force will not be interpreted here as a political ideology of certain political parties or social classes. Although, historically speaking, liberalism has been identified most often with the so-called middle classes, its ideology has a far wider basis. It aims above and beyond the demands of one social class to a political and social order of all society which is based on liberty, equality, and the reign of law. It is in this sense that liberalism will be dealt with in this essay.

It would be impossible to understand the liberalism of any one country if it were discussed only in terms of the

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an industrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolutionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Communist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and industrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be